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INTRODUCTION
Jane met her boyfriend Jim at a high school football game. Jane
was just a few days shy of sixteen at the time, and she and Jim, seven-
teen, instantly connected. They began dating, and a few months later,
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but before Jim's eighteenth birthday, the two had sex together for the
first time. In this respect, Jane and Jim were like many other teens
across the country.' Their relationship continued, and the two fell in
love. One night, Jane decided that she and Jim should record them-
selves having sex. They didn't have a webcam, so Jim suggested that
they use his new iPhone. The two made several videos, and Jim kept
them on his phone, never showing them to anyone else. Once Jane
got a new Verizon Droid, she began taking naked pictures of herself,
sometimes masturbating, and sent them to Jim. 2 Jim returned the
favor, often sending Jane pictures of his covered, but discernibly tur-
gid penis. 3 Jane never showed the pictures to anyone either, not even
her very best friend.
In most states, the sex thatJane and Jim had would be completely
legal. 4 Yet, under federal law and the law of many states, Jane and Jim
could face prosecution for the creation and dissemination of child
pornography. The current federal child-pornography statutes make
no distinction between pornography created by minors for one an-
other, on the one hand, and the deeply exploitative materials that
result from the actual rape and molestation of children, on the other.
Indeed, as more teenagers become technologically savvy, media re-
ports of the "sexting" epidemic abound. 5 Some older teens6 engaged
in activity similar to Jane and Jim's have even been prosecuted 7 and
required to register as sex offenders." Scholars have questioned the
wisdom of using laws that were originally intended to protect children
I The median age of first intercourse is 16.9 years for boys and 17.4 years for girls.
HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, U.S. TEEN SEXUAL AcTnVrry (2005) [hereinafter KAISER
FOUNDATION], http://www.kff.org/youthhivstds/upload/U-S-Teen-Sexual-Activity-Fact-
Sheet.pdf.
2 This behavior is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1466A, 2256(2)(A)(iii) (2006) (pro-
scribing obscene depictions of minors masturbating).
3 This behavior has also been criminalized. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,
114 n.11 (1990) (finding petitioner's overbreadth arguments unpersuasive as applied to a
statute that defined nudity as including depictions of covered male genitals in a "discerni-
bly turgid state").
4 The majority of states set the age of consent between sixteen and eighteen.
CAROLYN E. COCCA,JAILMAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES,
23-24 (2004); Ruth Jones, Inequality from Gender-Neutral Laws: Why Must Male Victims of Stat-
utory Rape Pay Child Support for Children Resulting from Their Victimization?, 36 GA. L. REV. 411,
420 (2002).
5 See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, A Girl's Nude Photo, and Altered Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,
2011, at Al; Beth Slovic, Sext Crimes, WILLAMETTE WEEK, Dec. 1, 2010, http://wweek.com/
editorial/3704/14839/; Melanie S. Welte, Iowa Prosecutors and Principals Warn Students that
Sexting Is Dangerous, Can Lead to Prison, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 13, 2010.
6 Throughout this Note I use the terms "teens" or "older teens" to refer to those
minors who have passed their state's age of consent.
7 See, e.g., State v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Iowa 2009) (affirming obscenity con-
viction of eighteen-year-old boy for sexting pictures to a younger female friend).
8 E.g., Welte, supra note 5.
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to prosecute them.9 Other academics have said that anyone who cre-
ates child pornography should be prosecuted, even minors who take
pictures of themselves.' 0 Almost no one" has argued, however, that
in cases such as Jane and Jim's, at least, the teens' pictures are actually
constitutionally protected speech. 12
The lack of vocal support for finding that the teens' speech is
constitutionally protected is rather surprising given the Supreme
Court's recent decision in United States v. Stevens.' 3 In Stevens, the Gov-
ernment argued that a statute criminalizing the commercial creation,
sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty14 was consti-
tutional because "the banned depictions of animal cruelty, as a class,
are categorically unprotected by the First Amendment."'15 For dis-
cerning new categorical exclusions from the First Amendment, the
Government proposed a "simple balancing test: 'Whether a given cat-
egory of speech enjoys First Amendment protection depends upon a
categorical balancing of the value of the speech against its societal
costs.' "16 The Court emphatically rejected this approach.' 7
9 See Clay Calvert, Sex, Cell Phones, Privacy, and the First Amendment: When Children Be-
come Child Pornographers and the Lolita Effect Undermines the Law, 18 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 1,
58-60 (2009) (projecting that the difficulties of enforcing antisexting statutes combined
with foreseeable costs would outweigh potential benefits); Stephen F. Smith, JailforJuvenile
Child Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor Leafy, 15 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 505, 506-07 (2008)
(arguing that a prosecution-based response to minors producing pornographic images of
themselves would "create far more problems than it would solve").
10 See, e.g., Mary Graw Leary, Self-Produced Child Pornography: The Appropriate Societal Re-
sponse to Juvenile Self-Sexual Exploitation, 15 VA. J. Soc. PoL'v & L. 1, 50 (2007) ("The crea-
tion of child pornography through juvenile self-exploitation is a growing phenomenon
with severe social harms, similar to that of other forms of child pornography possession,
production, and distribution.... The fact of self-harm, alone, however, cannot justify a
refusal to prosecute juveniles for self-exploitation.").
11 In Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010), the first federal court of appeals
case to address sexting, the Third Circuit noted that in the initial complaint the plaintiffs
alleged that any prosecution for sexting would be retaliation in violation of the minors'
First Amendment rights of free expression, "the expression being their appearing in two
[sexted] photographs." Id. at 148-49. Because the district court did not address those
claims, the Third Circuit also declined to address the issue despite having requested sup-
plemental briefing. Id. at 148.
12 Indeed, some writers-while questioning whether prosecutors should use child
pornography statutes in this fashion-have gone out of their way to underscore that they
are in no way arguing that sexting is protected speech. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 9, at 520
("To be clear, I am not making any sort of argument that child pornography-'self-pro-
duced' or otherwise-either is, or should be, constitutionally protected.").
13 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
14 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006).
15 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584.
16 Id. at 1585.
17 Id. ("As a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage, that sentence is startling
and dangerous. The First Amendment's guarantee of free speech does not extend only to
categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.
The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits
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Writing for an eight-Justice majority, Chief Justice John Roberts
acknowledged that the Government's views did not "emerge from a
vacuum,"' because the Court had often "described historically unpro-
tected categories of speech as being 'of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."19 Indeed,
the most relevant precedent on point seemed to be New York v. Fer-
ber,20 in which the Court held that certain nonobscene sexual depic-
tions of children could be fully proscribed without violating the First
Amendment.21 The Court reached this conclusion, in part, on the
assumption that the value of using real children in the production of
sexually explicit works was probably de minimis and thus did not raise
serious constitutional concerns. 22 In Stevens, however, the Court mini-
mized the importance of this factor. The result in Ferber, the Court
explained, was actually grounded in "a previously recognized, long-
established category of unprotected speech,"23 namely "speech or
writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid crimi-
nal statute."24
Scholars have noted that this description of Ferber is surprising
and may well make Stevens one of the most doctrinally significant con-
stitutional opinions of 2010.25 Stevens is a pathmarking decision that
makes plain that there is not a "child pornography exception," to the
of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any
attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.").
18 Id.
19 Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
20 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
21 See infra Part II.A.
22 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762-63.
23 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586.
24 Id. (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761-62).
25 See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, United States v. Stevens: Restricting Two Major Rationales
for Content-Based Speech Restrictions, 2010 CATO Sup. CT. REV. 67, 84-85 ("The Court's effort
in Stevens to limit categories of unprotected expression to the finite set that it has histori-
cally recognized is underscored by Stevens's novel characterization of the child pornogra-
phy exception to First Amendment protection.... [T] he Supreme Court's Stevens opinion
did not acknowledge that the Court had recognized child pornography as a new category
of unprotected expression. To the contrary, the Stevens Court treated child pornography
as a specific example of a longstanding more general category of unprotected expression,
citing a case that had recognized this broader excluded category just five years after
Chaplinsky."); Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, The Historical Approach to Unprotected Speech and
the Quantitative Analysis of Overbreadth in United States v. Stevens, 2010 Emerging Issues
5227 (LexisNexis July 30, 2010) ("Stevens announced a sea change in the Court's approach
to identifying categories of unprotected speech. The commonly accepted view before Ste-
vens comported with the government's position-that unprotected categories of speech
were identifiable through a cost-benefit analysis, allowing for the expansion of such classes
to new modes of expression and communication. Assuming the Court continues to adhere
to the Stevens approach, no additional classes of unprotected speech will be recognized
unless the classification is supported by a longstanding historical tradition, or unless it can
be creatively shoehorned into a pre-existing unprotected category.").
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First Amendment, but instead a "speech integral to criminal conduct
exception" that sometimes encompasses child pornography. The
Court's pronouncement is also socially significant since it comes just
as the United States is seemingly flooded by "a crime wave of child
pornography offenses perpetuated by middle- and high-schoolers." 26
To begin, even that description is jarring. For years, merely mention-
ing child pornography conjured up images of "old men in rain-
coats,"27 brutally seducing children to appear on film to "whet their
own [pedophilic] sexual appetites."28 Today, some have likened teens
such as Jane and Jim to these old men in raincoats. 29 Given the in-
creasingly draconian legislative responses30 to the "scourge of child
pornography,"s this fact is not only alarming but also underscores the
near impossibility of rational discourse once the phrase child pornog-
raphy is deployed. 32
This Note argues that prior to Stevens, many courts and scholars
assumed that child pornography was simply an unprotected category
of speech. In addition, courts and prosecutors in sexting cases further
assumed that older teens' sexting was child pornography. Both of the
premises were dubious from the start. Following Stevens, however,
these premises are untenable. First, sexting is simply not child por-
nography as the Supreme Court has repeatedly defined the term. Sec-
ond, even if sexting could be considered child pornography under
some theory, after Stevens there is no longer a "child pornography ex-
ception" to the First Amendment, but instead a "speech integral to
criminal conduct exception." After teens reach the age of consent,
their sexual activity is not typically criminal conduct.33 Thus, the First
26 Elizabeth C. Eraker, Stemming Sexting: Sensible Legal Approaches to Teenagers' Exchange
of Self-Produced Pornography, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 555, 555 (2010).
27 Mike Brunker, "Sexting" Surprise: Teens Face Child Porn Charges, MSNBC.COM (Jan. 15,
2009, 8:03 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28679588/ns/technologyandscience-
tech and-gadgets/ (quoting attorney stating that the intent of child pornography statutes
was to prevent the sexual abuse of children by "dirty old men in raincoats").
28 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
29 See Leary, supra note 10, at 50 (explaining that children who take pictures of them-
selves actually harm other children by doing so).
30 See Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of Criminal Laws
That Have Swept the Country, 58 Bur. L. REv. 1, 3 (2010) (discussing "legislative epidemics
fueled by high-profile cases, emotion-laden rhetoric, and inaccurate, but embedded, as-
sumptions about crime and criminals"). See also Erica Goode, Life Sentence for Possession of
Child Pornography Spurs Debate over Severity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2011, at A9.
31 Audrey Rogers, Protecting Children on the Internet: Mission Impossible?, 61 BAYLOR L.
REv. 323, 326 (2009).
32 See Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 921, 935 (2001)
("The former Solicitor General of the United States concluded that 'the issue of children
and pornography' is so 'incendiary' that people cannot discuss it rationally." (quoting for-
mer Solicitor General Drew S. Days III)).
33 Implicit in this assertion is that even after teens reach the age of consent, there may
be instances in which they are still not legally permitted to engage in certain sexual acts
2012]
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Amendment must fully protect sexted images of completely legal sex-
ual acts.
While neither dismissive of the potential harms that sexting may
engender nor doubtful of the legitimate worries of many parents, leg-
islators, and judges, this Note accepts that even serious harms that
result from speech may be contingent and indirect, and thus beyond
the power of the government to address. 34 Older teens' maturity
levels and their abilities to fully appreciate the consequences of their
actions are undoubtedly sound bases for constitutional distinctions.
3 5
The age of consent thus represents the solemn legislative judgment
that minors are mature enough to appreciate the potential conse-
quences of their sexual activity, including pregnancy, childbirth, abor-
tion, and sexually transmitted disease. Accordingly, this Note
expresses tremendous skepticism that sexting warrants independent
legislative action beyond setting the age of consent.
The structure of this Note is as follows. Part I briefly discusses
"sexting," its prevalence among today's teenagers, and how it has re-
sulted in a surprising number of recent prosecutions of teens under
various child-pornography statutes. Part II explores the growth and
development of child-pornography law in the United States and ex-
plains that using child-pornography statutes to go after what may be
nothing more than high-tech flirting is plainly contrary to language in
several key First Amendment cases. Part III explains that after Stevens,
because there is no longer a child-pornography exception to the First
Amendment but instead an exception for "speech integral to criminal
conduct," child-pornography statutes must necessarily be tied to an-
other "valid criminal statute" to survive constitutional scrutiny. With
respect to older teens' sexting, the most logical starting point is state
statutory-rape laws, which generally set the age of consent. Because of
widely varying state statutes regarding the age of consent, Part IV criti-
cally examines the potential consequences of tying First Amendment
protections to these underlying state criminal statutes. Part IV then
offers an alternative analytical framework that may help those states
that wish to do so address the harms of sexting while respecting the
with certain persons. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN., § 16-6-4 (2008) (addressing aggravated child
molestation).
34 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002) ("While the Gov-
ernment asserts that the images can lead to actual instances of child abuse, the causal link
is contingent and indirect. The harm does not necessarily follow from the speech, but
depends upon some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts." (citation
omitted)).
35 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010) (noting in the context of
juvenile sentencing that "[d] ifficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding
impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust" those whom a juvenile views "as part of the adult
world a rebellious youth rejects," can result in poorly reasoned decisions by teenagers).
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strictures of the First Amendment. That approach, however, is
fraught with its own set of concerns, constitutional and otherwise.
I
SEXTING: WHAT Is IT? WHY ARE TEENS DOING IT?
Sexting is the sending of nude photographs via text message. 36
Although many adults likely sext,3 7 recent studies show that the prac-
tice is quite prevalent among today's teenagers.38 Since youths be-
tween the ages of thirteen and seventeen send more of the seventy-five
billion text messages that are exchanged in the United States each
month than any other age group,39 the fact that some of those
messages are sexts is not surprising. 40 Although sexting has been de-
scribed as the "modern equivalent of 'streaking'," 4 ' it is perhaps more
accurate to describe the process as a "more technological approach to
sending a flirtatious note."42 The majority of teens who sext report
doing so in order to be "fun or flirtatious," or to perhaps send their
partner a "sexy present."43
As they generally are with youthful indiscretions, many parents
are outraged by sexting.44 Teachers and school administrators have
also taken note of the phenomenon, and have begun confiscating stu-
36 State v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Iowa 2009).
37 SeeJessica Leshnoff, Sexting Not Just for Kids, AARP (June 2011), http://www.aarp.
org/relationships/love-sex/info-I 1-2009/sexting-not-just for kids.html ("[T] he reality is
that more and more of the 50-plus set, both single and married, routinely use text messag-
ing to send tantalizing pictures and provocative words to their partner, according to rela-
tionship experts."); Anthony Wayne, Sexting: Not Just for Teens Any More, TEXT MESSAGE
BLOC (Apr. 12, 2009, 10:30 AM), http://www.textmessageblog.mobi/2009/04/12/sexting-
adults/ ("Middle aged men and women ... are now also getting involved in sexting.").
38 At least one study puts the percentage of teens who sext as high as 20%. Sex and
Tech: Results from a Survey of Teens and Young Adults, NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND
UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, 1 (2008), http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/
SexTechSummary.pdf [hereinafter NCPTUP Study]. But see Amanda Lenhart, Teens and
Sexting, PEW INTERNET & Am. LFE PROJECT, 4 (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.pewinternet.
org/-/media//Files/Reports/2009/PIPTeens andSexting.pdf (reporting that only 4%
of teenagers ages twelve to seventeen who own cellular phones "report sending a sexually
suggestive nude or nearly-nude photo or video of themselves to someone else").
39 U.S. Teen Mobile Report: Calling Yesterday, Texting Today, Using Apps Tomorrow, NI-
SENWIRE (Oct. 14, 2010), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online-mobile/u-s-teen-
mobile-report-calling-yesterday-texting-today-using-apps-tomorrow/.
40 Donna St. George, 6,473 Texts a Month, But at What Cost?, WAsH. POST, Feb. 22,
2009, at Al.
41 Eraker, supra note 26, at 557.
42 Bryn Ostrager, Note, SMS. OMG! LOL! TTYL: Translating the Law to Accommodate
Today's Teens and the Evolution from Texting to Sexting, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 712, 713 (2010).
43 NCPTUP Study, supra note 38, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44 See Naked Photos, E-mails Get Teens in Trouble, FoXNEWS.COM, (June 5, 2008), http://
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,363438,00.html#ixzzl6QilmRMI (.'I just don't under-
stand why kids would do a stupid thing like that,' said Rochelle Hoins of Castle Rock,
Colorado, where 18 students in her twin sons' middle school sent around nude pictures of
themselves last year. 'We did dumb things when we were kids, but not like that.'").
2012] 375
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dents' cell phones45 and giving presentations detailing the dangers
associated with sexting.46 Reports about sexting have appeared in ma-
jor newspapers. 47 Indeed, as two scholars recently noted, to see how
quickly sexting has become an important and prominent legal issue in
America, one need only turn on the television.48 Local prosecutors,
"trying to jam square pegs into round holes,' 49 have vigorously re-
sponded, charging some minors who likely believed they were only
virtually flirting with creating, possessing, and disseminating child
pornography. 50
While some parents are outraged at the very notion of sexting,
others are more alarmed at the prospect of teens like Jane and Jim
5 1
being labeled as sex offenders. And like their children who may have
believed that they were only flirting, some parents are legitimately
confused about how many of these pictures are child pornography at
all. For instance, in Miller v. Mitchell,52 the first federal court of ap-
peals case to address sexting, several Pennsylvania high-school stu-
dents were threatened with prosecution for child pornography
because of photographs they had on their cell phones. One parent,
whose daughter had appeared in a photograph wearing a bathing suit,
asked the district attorney how he could charge her daughter with
child pornography based on that image. 53 The district attorney said
that he could charge the girl because she was posing "provocatively.
54
Another set of parents-whose daughter and her friend were pictured
from the waist up wearing "white, opaque bras," while talking on the
phone and holding a peace sign-protested that the girls were
"merely being 'goof balls."' 55 The district attorney again pointed to
45 See, e.g., id. (describing how school administrators in Santa Fe, Texas, confiscated
numerous cellular phones after nude pictures of students began circulating).
46 See, e.g., Welte, supra note 5.
47 E.g., Sean D. Hamill, Pennsylvania:Judge Blocks Charges in Cell Phone Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 2009, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/31/us/31brfs-
JUDGEBLOCKSCBRF.html; Stephanie Steinberg, Sexting Surges Nationwide, and It's Not
Just Teens Doing It; Young People Must Be Careful, Experts Say, USA TODAY, July 21, 2010, at D8.
48 See Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, When Sex and Cell Phones Collide: Inside the
Prosecution of a Teen Sexting Case, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & Er. L.J. 1, 1 (2009) ("It seems that
in 2009, the definitive way one knows a legal issue in the United States is important is when
it is featured on one of those 'ripped-from-the-headlines' episodes of Dick Wolf s highly
successful legal drama series, Law & Order: Special Victims Unit." (footnote omitted)).
49 Id. at 3.
50 See, e.g., Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting defendant
district attorney's public announcement that students found with "inappropriate images of
minors" could be prosecuted for possession or distribution of child pornography under
Pennsylvania law).
51 See supra Introduction. Jane andJim's case is a fictional account I created based on
various aspects of recent cases and news events.
52 598 F.3d 139 (2010).
53 Id. at 144.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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the fact that the girls "were posed provocatively." 56 The parents' in-
credulity about these pictures being considered child pornography at
all is not surprising. Yet, neither was the district attorney's reaction.
Under the generally prevailing standard for determining whether an
image is child pornography, even these "goof ball" photographs might
qualify.57
Understanding how child-pornography statutes-once thought
to be designed to protect children from sexual abuse and exploita-
tion-are now a vehicle for suppressing and punishing teen sexual
expression warrants a brief study of child-pornography legislation and
judicial interpretation of those statutes. First, however, it is important
to outline the factual limits of the theory that this Note advocates.
Generally, teen sexual expression through photographs involves three
kinds of cases. Teens have disseminated images of themselves: "(1) as
a means of earning money on the sale of those images, 58 (2) as a
means of forming or keeping friendships formed over the Internet, 59
and, most commonly, (3) as part of their own private, voluntary sexual
exploits."60 Sexting falls into this third category, and thus this Note
proceeds on the assumption that some teens who engage in sexual
activity voluntarily memorialize those acts in pictures using their cell
phones in order to titillate or entice their sexual partners. 61 This
Note further assumes that sexting is intended to be private. It is, of
course, into this third category that most of the recent, troubling pros-
ecutions actually fall. This category of images also presents the most
difficult constitutional questions following the Stevens holding. In-
deed, if the private, voluntary sexual exploits are legal in the first in-
stance, it is ironic that the pictures themselves are thought to cause
unique harms warranting prosecution.62
56 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
57 See infra notes 90-115 and accompanying text.
58 States have a freer hand in regulating minors' ability to work, even where First
Amendment concerns are implicated. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944).
59 See Smith, supra note 9, at 523 (explaining that Internet "friends" may actually be
adults posing as teens to coerce and entice teens to send naked pictures).
60 Id. at 522.
61 At least two recent articles have drawn a distinction between primary sexting and
secondary sexting. See Calvert, supra note 9, at 30; Elizabeth M. Ryan, Note, Sexting: How the
State Can Prevent a Moment of Indiscretion from Leading to a Lifetime of Unintended Consequences
for Minors and Young Adults, 96 IowA L. REv. 357, 381-82 (2010). Secondary sexting in-
volves the recipient of a sext sending the sexted message to a third-party without the origi-
nal sender's consent. Ryan, supra, at 361 & 362 n.31. Although, there may be distinct
harms, such as "revenge porn" associated with secondary sexting, see id. at 363, secondary
sexting is beyond the scope of this Note. For a persuasive discussion suggesting that state
tort law may be the appropriate vehicle for addressing secondary sexting, see id. at 380-82.
62 See A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) ("If a minor cannot
be criminally prosecuted for having sex with another minor . . . it follows that a minor
2012]
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II
INCENDIARY INCOHERENCE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILD-
PORNOGRAPHY LAw
A. The Journey from Clandestine Child Abuse to Jane and Jim's
Cell Phones
Legislation aimed at child pornography is of fairly recent vintage.
In the 1970s concerns about child sexual abuse became a national
emergency 6 3 and thus "awareness [a] nd concern about child pornog-
raphy escalated dramatically."64 Congress responded and in 1978
passed its first statute specifically targeting child pornography, the
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act.65 The Act
outlawed the use of children in the production of obscene materials.6 6
At the time, sexually explicit speech was protected by the First Amend-
ment unless it exceeded the bounds of the obscenity test set forth in
Miller v. California.67 While Congress respected these constitutional
limits, thinking they represented a boundary it could not cross,68 not
all of the states reacted accordingly. Indeed, by 1982, "[t]he Federal
Government and 47 [s]tates [had] sought to combat [the exploitive
use of children in the production of pornography] with statutes spe-
cifically directed at the production of child pornography," with at least
half of these statutes not requiring the materials to be legally
obscene.69
The Supreme Court responded to these enactments in 1982 in
the case of New York v. Ferber.70 The case arose when Paul Ferber, the
owner of a Manhattan bookstore, sold two films of young boys mastur-
bating to undercover police officers. 71 Ferber was indicted under the
two New York statutes controlling the dissemination of child pornog-
cannot be criminally prosecuted for taking a picture of herself having sex with another
minor.") (Padovano, J., dissenting).
63 Adler, supra note 32, at 928.
64 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Ar-roRNEv GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOCRAPHY: FINAL
REPORT 408 (1986) [hereinafter ArroRNEV GENERAL'S REPORT].
65 Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251
(2006)).
66 See id.; Adler, supra note 32, at 929-30.
67 See 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). In Miller, for the first time a majority of the Court
agreed on a definition of obscenity. According to Miller, the "basic guidelines for the trier
of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person applying contemporary community stan-
dards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patenly offensive way, sexual conduct specifi-
cally defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. (internal citations omitted).
68 See Adler, supra note 32, at 930 n.33 (citing articles discussing congressional de-
bates on whether Congress could ban nonobscene child pornography).
69 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749-50 n.2 (1982) (collecting such statutes).
70 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
71 Id. at 751-52.
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raphy.72 A jury acquitted Ferber of the two counts of promoting an
obscene sexual performance but found him guilty of two counts that
did not require proof that the films were obscene.73 The New York
Court of Appeals reversed Ferber's conviction, noting that because of
the explicit inclusion of an obscenity standard in the statute under
which Ferber was acquitted, it could not construe the other statute to
include an obscenity standard.74  Therefore, "the statute
would.. . prohibit the promotion of materials which are traditionally
entitled to constitutional protection from government interference
under the First Amendment. 75
The Supreme Court granted New York's petition for certiorari,
which presented a single question: "To prevent the abuse of children
who are made to engage in sexual conduct for commercial purposes,
could the New York State Legislature, consistent with the First Amend-
ment, prohibit the dissemination of material which shows children en-
gaged in sexual conduct, regardless of whether such material is
obscene?" 76 In a unanimous decision, the Court answered yes, stating
that the Miller test bore "no connection to the issue of whether a child
has been physically or psychologically harmed in the production of
the work."'77 Thus, child pornography 'joined a small and ragtag
band of categories of expression that are excluded from constitutional
protection by reason of their content. 78
The Court held that states were entitled to greater leeway in the
regulation of pornographic depictions of children for several reasons.
First, the State had a compelling interest in protecting the physical
and psychological well-being of minors that was "evident beyond the
need for elaboration. '79 Second, the distribution of materials depict-
ing sexual activities of juveniles was "intrinsically related to the sexual
abuse of children" in that the materials were a "permanent record of
the child's participation" in the act and also because of the need to
effectively control the distribution network for child pornography. 80
Third, the "advertising and selling of child pornography provid[ed]
an economic motive" for the production of materials that were illegal
throughout the country. 81 Indeed, the Court noted, "[iit rarely has
been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press
72 Id. at 752.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. (quoting People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 678 (N.Y. 1981)).
76 Id. at 753.
77 Id. at 761.
78 Adler, supra note 32, at 930.
79 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57.
80 Id. at 759-60.
81 Id. at 761.
2012]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of
conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute."8 2 Fourth, the value of
permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of chil-
dren engaged in lewd sexual conduct was "exceedingly modest, if not
de minimis."83 Fifth, classifying child pornography is a category of ma-
terial outside the First Amendment was not incompatible with earlier
decisions. 84 "[I]t is not rare," the Court held, "that a content-based
classification of speech has been accepted because it may be appropri-
ately generalized that within the confines of the given classification,
the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive
interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is
required."85
Given the Court's focus on child abuse and its view that New
York's statute was focused on "hard core" child pornography,86 it
seemed that Ferber's reach might be somewhat limited. In fact, how-
ever, any predictions of a narrow exclusion for child pornography
proved false. Congress quickly reacted to Ferber, passing the Child Pro-
tection Act of 1984.87 In the Act, Congress modified the definition of
sexual conduct, essentially adopting the New York statute upheld in
Ferber,88 and thus for the first time at the federal level proscribed cer-
tain nonobscene depictions of children. 89 The Act also increased the
age of "children" for purposes of the statute from sixteen to eighteen,
thus significantly expanding the universe of what could be considered
child pornography in the first instance. 90 This was a curious develop-
ment because the age of consent in the federal maritime and territo-
rial jurisdictions was-and remains-sixteen. 91
A few years later, in United States v. Dost,92 the Southern District of
California laid out what is now the prevailing standard for lascivious
exhibition of the genitals, an element of the federal child-pornogra-
82 Id. at 761-62 (quoting Ciboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498
(1949)). Though this never seemed to be the Court's primary rationale, after Stevens it
appears to be the only rationale the Court accepts. See infra Part III.
83 Id. at 762.
84 Id. at 763.
85 Id. at 763-64.
86 Id. at 773.
87 Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516,
2251-2254, 2256 (2006)).
88 The Act altered the language from "lewd" to "lascivious" exhibition of the genitals.
See Adler, supra note 32, at 932 n.45 (citing Child Protection Act).
89 Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984).
90 See 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2006); Adler, supra note 32, at 930 n.45.
91 See 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a).
92 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986), affid sub. nom United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d
1239 (9th Cir. 1987).
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phy statute. 93 The court concluded that the following factors should
inform this determination: (1) whether the focal point of the visual
depiction is the child's genitals or pubic area; (2) whether the setting
of the visual depiction is sexually suggestive (i.e., in a place or pose
generally associated with sexual activity); (3) whether the child is de-
picted in an unnatural pose, or in inappropriate attire, considering
the age of the child; (4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed,
or nude; (5) whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a
willingness to engage in sexual activity; and (6) whether the visual de-
piction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the
viewer.94
Thus, it is apparent that by 1986, the definition of child pornog-
raphy was becoming unmoored from the rationale laid out in Ferber.
95
Although none of the Dost factors were determinative, neither did Dost
provide an exhaustive list of the elements of lascivious exhibition. 96
One can easily imagine numerous pictures that could satisfy these re-
quirements, yet not at all require the abuse of children.97 The Su-
preme Court's next foray into the field was its 1988 decision in Osborne
v. Ohio.98 Rather than pursuing its normal course and tightly cabining
legislation that curtails First Amendment freedoms, 99 the Court itself
gave the green light to expanding the universe of constitutionally
proscribable material. Although Osborne is generally cited for the pro-
position that unlike obscenity mere possession of child pornography
could be criminalized, the statute the Court sustained swept much
more broadly than the statute at issue in Ferber. Specifically, whereas
the New York statute criminalized depictions of minors that contained
93 In addition to the Ninth Circuit, most of the other courts of appeals have also
adopted the Dost test. See United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 181-82 (3d Cir. 2010);
United States v. Brown, 579 F.3d 672, 680 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Wallenfang, 568
F.3d 649, 657 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 251 (2d Cir. 2008);
United States v. Frabizio, 459 F.3d 80, 87 (Ist Cir. 2006); United States v. Soderstrand, 412
F.3d 1146, 1155 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir.
2001). But see United States v. Noel, 581 F.3d 490, 500 (7th Cir. 2009) ("We have not yet
taken a position on whether the Dost factors represent a permissible instruction . . .");
United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1299 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Because lascivious is not
defined under the PROTECT Act, we apply its ordinary meaning of 'exciting sexual
desires; salacious.'").
94 Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832.
95 See Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REv 209, 238-41
(2001) (reviewing changes in the definition of "child pornography" since Ferber).
96 Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832 ("Of course, a visual depiction need not involve all of
these factors to be a 'lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area."').
97 The pictures at issue in A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007),
immediately come to mind. See infra Part II.B.
98 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
99 See Adler, supra note 32, at 924-26 (contrasting the Supreme Court's rulings in
subversive advocacy cases with those in child pornography cases).
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"lewd exhibition of the genitals," 100 the Ohio statute proscribed nude
depictions of minors constituting either a "lewd exhibition" or involv-
ing a "graphic focus on the genitals." 10 1
Osborne vastly expanded the amount of potentially proscribable
speech. 10 2 Under the "graphic focus on the genitals" standard, a per-
son could be prosecuted for a picture in which a child's genitals ap-
pear at the center, regardless of whether the depiction was
"lascivious. ' 10 3 Further, "lewd exhibitions of nudity" was far broader
than "lewd exhibitions of the genitalia"10 4 because Ohio law defined
"nudity" to include depictions of pubic areas, buttocks, the female
breast, covered male genitals "in a discernibly turgid state," as well as
genitals. 105 In dissent, Justice William Brennan presciently hypothe-
sized that under this definition, pictures of fully clothed teenagers en-
gaged in otherwise innocuous activity might well be considered child
pornography. 0 6
His fears were prominently realized in the 1992 case of United
States v. Knox.107 Stephen Knox was a graduate student in whose pos-
session officials found "three films of very young girls dancing around
in bathing suits, leotards, and similarly 'revealing attire."'" 08 Al-
though the girls were not naked, the films had titles like "Little Girl
Bottoms" and featured prominent "crotch shots."'1 9 Because of the
camera's insistent focus on the girls' clothed genital regions, the
Third Circuit determined that the films included lascivious exhibi-
tions of the genitals or pubic area. 110 When Knox petitioned for certi-
orari arguing that the absence of nudity invalidated the lascivious
100 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 751 (1982) (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(3)
(McKinney 2008)).
101 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 113 (quoting State v. Young, 525 N.E.2d 1363, 1368 (Ohio
1988)) (providing the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of the Ohio statute).
102 See Adler, supra note 32, at 948-50 (discussing the breadth of the statute upheld in
Osborne and explaining how the decision "revealed the Court's thinking on how it might
expand [the] definition [of child pornography] in the future").
103 Id. at 948-49.
104 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 129 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
105 Id. at 126-27 ("In short §§2907.323 and 2907.01(H) use simple nudity, without
more, as a way of defining child pornography.").
106 Id. at 131-32 ("Furthermore, the Ohio law forbids not only depictions of nudity per
se, but also depictions of the buttocks, breast, or pubic area with less than a 'full, opaque
covering.' Thus, pictures of fashion models wearing semitransparent clothing might be
illegal, as might a photograph depicting a fully clad male that nevertheless captured his
genitals 'in a discernibly turgid state.'" (emphasis added)).
107 United States v. Knox (Knox 1), 977 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1992).
108 PAUL R. ABRAMSON ET AL., SEXUAL RIGHTS IN AMERICA: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND
THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 138 (2003).
109 Id.
110 Knox I, 977 F.2d at 817 (holding that the visual depictions at issue violated federal
child pornography laws despite body parts being covered by clothing).
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exhibition finding, the Justice Department agreed. 11  Solicitor Gen-
eral Drew S. Days III filed a brief in support of Knox's appeal indicat-
ing that the child-pornography statutes apply only to nudity or to
genitals whose contours are evident through clothing.112 In response
to the Solicitor General's report, the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the Third Circuit for reconsideration. 113 The case and the
Court's remand order ignited a "political firestorm" that included a
resolution by members of Congress condemning the Solicitor Gen-
eral's interpretation and the unusual additional step of members of
Congress filing briefs in the case. 114
On remand, the Third Circuit maintained its position. It consid-
ered and rejected the Solicitor General's views, and held that the fed-
eral child-pornography statute contained no nudity or discernibility
requirement. 115 Knox again turned to the Supreme Court, but likely
because of the "political firestorm," the Justice Department aban-
doned its previous position. In a letter to Attorney General Janet
Reno, President Bill Clinton stated that he found "all forms of child
pornography offensive and harmful," and that he wanted the federal
government to "lead aggressively in the attack against the scourge of
child pornography."' 16 In the end, the Supreme Court denied certio-
rari, and Knox's conviction stood."l 7
Congress continued expanding the definition of child pornogra-
phy with the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA). 11
In response to advancing technology that aided the creation of virtual
child pornography-that is, wholly computer-generated images that
do not require actual children-Congress banned materials that ap-
pear to be depictions of children engaged in sexual conduct. 119 In
detailed findings, Congress stated that even though such images are
made without the use of real children, virtual child pornography must
be prevented because it "inflames the desires of child molesters,
pedophiles, and child pornographers"'120 and "encourag[es] a societal
111 ABRAMSON ET AL., supra note 108, at 138.
112 Id. at 138-39.
113 United States v. Knox (Knox 1), 32 F.3d 733, 737 (3rd Cir. 1994); ABRAMSON ET AL.,
supra note 108, at 139.
114 See Adler, supra note 32, at 952 n.140.
115 Knox II, 32 F.3d at 737; ABRAMSON ET AL, supra note 108, at 139.
116 ABRAMSON ET AL., supra note 108, at 139.
117 513 U.S. 1109 (1995).
118 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-26 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2256
(2006)).
119 See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B)-(C) ("'[C]hild pornography' means any visual depic-
tion . . .where [it appears] that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.").
120 § 121(1)(10) (B), 110 Stat. at 3009-27 ("[I]t inflames the desires of child molesters,
pedophiles, and child pornographers who prey on children, thereby increasing the crea-
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perception of children as sexual objects." 121 Whether or not the law
was good policy, it was "a total departure from the basis of child por-
nography law-the abuse of children in the production of the
material." 22
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,123 the Court struck down the
provisions of the CPPA related to virtual child pornography. The
Court noted that in contrast to the speech in Ferber, the CPPA prohib-
ited speech that "record[ed] no crime and create[d] no victims."'124
Virtual child pornography was simply not "intrinsically related" to the
sexual abuse of children.' 25 Rejecting the Government's argument
that virtual child pornography could lead to instances of actual abuse,
an indirect harm sufficient to sustain the statute, the Court noted that
"Ferber's judgment about child pornography was based on how it was
made, not on what it communicated. The case reaffirmed that where
the speech is neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not
fall outside the protection of the First Amendment."126 The Court
also pointed out the oddity of proscribing visual depictions of persons
who appear to be under the age of eighteen engaged in sexual activ-
ity. 1 27 Eighteen, after all, was "higher than the legal age for marriage
in many States, as well as the age at which persons may consent to
sexual relations."' 28 Further, it was "undeniable that some youths en-
gage in sexual activity before the legal age . . . on their own
inclination."129
Thus stood the "internally incoherent"130 body of child-pornogra-
phy law when local prosecutors began to use the child-pornography
statutes to prosecute instances of sexting. It is unclear whether prose-
cutors simply ignored the language from Free Speech Coalition or in
their zeal to respond to what they perceived as a growing problem
assumed that the case only applied to virtual child pornography. At
any rate, given cases like Dost, Osborne, and Knox, it was not an exagger-
ation to say that a fourteen-year-old girl who voluntarily photographs
herself in a bathing suit could have been prosecuted under some
tion and distribution of child pornography and the sexual abuse and exploitation of actual
children who are victimized as a result of the existence and use of these materials .... ).
121 Id. § 121(1)(11)(A) ("[T]he sexualization and eroticization of minors through any
form of child pornographic images has a deleterious effect on all children by encouraging
a societal perception of children as sexual objects and leading to further sexual abuse and
exploitation of them .... ").
122 Adler, supra note 95, at 244.
123 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
124 Id. at 250.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 250-51 (emphasis added).
127 Id. at 247.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Adler, supra note 32, at 927.
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child-pornography statutes if she had posed provocatively. 131 The
journey from protecting children from "old men in raincoats" to pro-
tecting Jane and Jim from themselves sprang from this incoherence.
B. Incoherence As-Applied
A.H. v. State132 is an illustrative example of the incoherence of
child-pornography law. Sixteen-year-old A.H. and her seventeen-year-
old boyfriend, J.G.W., were charged under Florida's child-pornogra-
phy statute with one count of producing, directing, or promoting a
photograph or representation that they knew to include the sexual
conduct of a child.'3 3 The charges were based on digital photos the
two took of themselves naked and engaged in sexual behavior.' 3 4 The
State acknowledged that the photos were never shown to a third party,
but highlighted that A.H. and J.G.W. e-mailed the photos to another
computer from A.H.'s home.135
A.H. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the statute was uncon-
stitutional as applied to her because it implicated her privacy rights
under the Florida constitution.1 3 6 She further pointed out that she
was actually younger than her alleged "victim," and that criminal pros-
ecution was not the least intrusive means of furthering Florida's inter-
ests.137 The trial court rejected these arguments and denied the
motion to dismiss. 138 While assuming that the statute implicated
A.H.'s privacy rights, the trial court nevertheless held that the State
had a compelling interest in "protecting children from sexual ex-
ploitation, particularly the form of sexual exploitation involved in this
131 See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text; see a/soJohn A. Humbach, Sexting and
the First Amendment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433, 454 n.116 (2010) (explaining that any
teen who takes even a semi-nude picture of herself is in "definite legal jeopardy").
132 949 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
133 Id. at 235. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.071(3) (West 2006) ("A person is
guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when, knowing the character and
content thereof, he or she produces, directs, or promotes any performance which includes
sexual conduct by a child less than 18 years of age. Whoever violates this subsection is
guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or
s. 775.084."); accord 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2006). J.G.W. was also charged with one count of
possession of child pornography in violation of FLA. STAT. § 827.071(5); accord 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(b).
134 A.H., 949 So. 2d at 235.
135 Id. Although these pictures were e-mailed from a computer, many modern cellular
phones also have e-mail capabilities. Thus, sexted images can also be transmitted via e-mail
by using a cellular phone.
136 Id.
137 Id.; accord United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
("The Government may ... regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in
order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further
the articulated interest[.]" (quoting Sable Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989))).
138 A.H., 949 So. 2d at 235-36.
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case. This compelling interest exists whether the person sexually ex-
ploiting the child is an adult or a minor and is certainly triggered by
the production of 117 photographs of minors engaging in graphic
sexual acts."'139
On appeal, A.H. further argued that given the closeness in age
between her and J.G.W. and the State's failure to allege that the pic-
tures were shown to anyone else, the only compelling state interest
that Florida could possibly assert was protecting A.H. and J.G.W. from
"engaging in sexual behavior until their minds and bodies had ma-
tured."1 40 The appellate court said that implicit in this argument was
the notion that Florida's right to privacy encompassed a minor's right
to sexual intercourse and that it further extended to situations where
the minor memorializes the act through pictures or video.' 4'
The court rejected these arguments for several reasons. First, a
decision to take photographs and to keep a record that may be shown
in the future weighs against finding a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.' 42 Next, minors engaged in sexual relationships, unlike adults,
have no reasonable expectation that their relationships will continue
and that the photographs would not be shown to someone else inten-
tionally or unintentionally. 143 The photographs had "market value"
and could wind up in the wrong hands because a teenager would inev-
itably disseminate the pictures to other members of the public for
profit or bragging rights. 144 Finally, the court noted that the child-
pornography statute was "intended to protect minors like appellant
and her co-defendant from their own lack ofjudgment."145 Though
apparently capable of consenting to sex, the "children are not mature
enough to make rational decisions concerning all of the possible neg-
ative implications of producing these videos.' 46
139 Id. at 236.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 237. If this were a test of general applicability and not simply limited to
sexual photographs, many people would no longer have any reasonable expectation of
privacy at all in the manifold life activities they choose to commemorate through photo-
graphs or other recordings.
143 Id. It is unclear whether the result would have been different if A.H. and J.G.W.
had been betrothed. Further, in Florida, in certain circumstances, minors are permitted to
marry. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.0405 (West 2006).
144 A.H., 949 So. 2d at 237.
145 Id. at 238. The court did not provide any support for this assertion.
146 Id. at 239. The court failed to address "all of the possible negative implications"
that could flow from treating A.H. and J.G.W. as sex offenders. See, e.g., Eraker, supra note
26, at 588-89 ("[A] sexting teenager convicted of child pornography may be ostracized by
classmates.., the ensuing harassment and bullying at school might exacerbate the condi-
tions that prompted the sexting in the first instance."); Shannon Shafron-Perez, Note, Aver-
age Teenager or Sex Offender? Solutions to the Legal Dilemma Caused by Sexting, 26 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 431, 449 (2009) ("Minors who are convicted of sexting are punished
criminally, in addition to being chastised by their peers and tortured by internal shame
[Vol. 97:369
THE AGE OF CONSENT
One judge vigorously dissented from the majority's decision to
use a statute that was designed to protect children from abuse in or-
der to punish a teenager for her own mistake. 147 The dissenting
judge would have found that the prosecution violated A.H.'s right to
privacy. 148 The Florida Supreme Court had already determined that
prosecuting minors for unlawful carnal intercourse violated minors'
right to privacy.149 Thus, "[i]f a minor cannot be criminally prose-
cuted for having sex with another minor ... it follows that a minor
cannot be criminally prosecuted for taking a picture of herself having
sex with another minor."150 The dissent noted that there was simply
no evidence that the minors intended to show the photographs to
third parties and that accordingly, the photographs were as private as
the act they depicted. 151 Somewhat strangely, the dissenting judge
still went out of his way to note that he did not "condone the child's
conduct."152
Although A.H.'s case arose in Florida state court, she and J.G.W.
likely violated federal law as well. Section 2251 of Title 18 of the U.S.
Code makes it a crime for any person to engage any minor in any
sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing visual depic-
tions of that conduct if the person knows or has reason to know that
the images will be transmitted via computer. 153 Although the court
only placed A.H. on probation, had she been prosecuted under the
federal statute, she would have been fined and imprisoned between
fifteen and thirty years.154 Such a prosecution of course would have
been in direct tension with the language of Free Speech Coalition, which
"reaffirmed that where the speech is neither obscene nor the product
of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the protection of the First
Amendment." 55
and regret. Criminalizing this conduct is only compounding the pain for the minors
involved.").
147 A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239 (Padovano, J., dissenting).
148 See id.
149 Id. (citing B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995)).
150 A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239 (Padovano, J., dissenting); see also Salter v. State, 906 N.E.2d
212, 222-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that when an age-of-consent law is inconsistent
with the definition of minor in state's child-pornography law, vagueness issues prevent
prosecuting persons for activities similar to sexting).
151 A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239-40 (Padovano, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 239.
153 See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2006).
154 See id. § 2251(e).
155 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 251 (2002) (citing New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982)).
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C. What of the First Amendment Rights of Minors?
Yet, no one seemed to argue that the statute violated A.H.'s First
Amendment rights. 15 6 In fact, several months after A.H. was handed
down, Mary Graw Leary wrote a foundational article decrying the very
disturbing social behaviors resulting from increased access and expo-
sure to child pornography. 157 In Leary's view, people like A.H. were
not engaged in sexual exploration but instead "self-exploitation" and
the production of child pornography.158  The new frontier for the
production and distribution of child pornography was the cellular
camera phone.1 59 In a strange move, Leary claims that teens like A.H.
are actually victims. Voluntary participation in child pornography
156 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that minors have First Amendment rights.
See, e.g., Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735 (2011) ("[M]inors are enti-
tled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection, and only in relatively narrow
and well-defined circumstances may government bar public dissemination of protected
materials to them." (alteration in original) (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 212-13 (1975))); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969) ("Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution.
They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect .... ). However,
minors do not necessarily enjoy full First Amendment protection while in schools. See, e.g.,
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2007) ("[T]he constitutional rights of students
in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other set-
tings." (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986))); see also id.
at 410-11 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he First Amendment, as originally understood,
does not protect student speech in public schools."). Thus, school officials confiscating
cellular phones during school hours in response to sexting that substantially and materially
disrupted the school day would not necessarily raise constitutional concerns. Cf J.S. v. Blue
Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 08-4138, slip op. at 3 (3d Cir.June 13, 2011) (en banc) ("Because
J.S. was suspended from school for speech that indisputably caused no substantial disrup-
tion in school and that could not reasonably have led school officials to forecast substantial
disruption in school, the School District's actions violated J.S.'s First Amendment free
speech rights."). Although the Court has allowed restrictions on minors' rights to
purchase nonobscene sexual material, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), it is far
from clear that this rationale extends to the creation or possession of sexual speech, see,
e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 878 (1997) ("For the purposes of our decision, we need
neither accept nor reject the Government's submission that the First Amendment does not
forbid a blanket prohibition on all 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' messages communi-
cated to a 17-year-old-no matter how much value the message may contain and regardless
of parental approval. It is at least clear that the strength of the Government's interest in protecting
minors is not equally strong throughout the coverage of this broad statute." (emphasis added)).
Thus, at least outside of school, the government's ability to restrict an older minor's right
to "self-produced pornography" was neither settled by Ferber nor Ginsberg. See also Entm't
Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. at 2729 ("No doubt a State possesses legitimate power to protect
children from harm, but that does not include a free-floating power to restrict the ideas to
which children may be exposed." (internal citations omitted)).
157 See Leary, supra note 10, at 4. Although Mary Graw Leary's article does not use the
term "sexting" in its discussions of "self-produced child pornography" with cellular phones,
it was perhaps the first work to deal with the subject and has been cited by several other
articles that explore sexting. See, e.g., Eraker, supra note 26, at 562; Ryan, supra note 61, at
377; Shafron-Perez, supra note 146, at 448.
158 Leary, supra note 10, at 5-6 ("Whatever the circumstances ... this activity is the
production of child pornography . ).
159 Id. at 24.
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produces victims because, throughout life, as people repeatedly view
the images, the child is victimized. 160 "Indeed, to treat the possession
of these images so differently than that of non-self-produced images
would suggest these victims are less worthy of societal protection."161
Further, she says that when teens like A.H. record their own sexual
activities, they actually harm other children because child molesters
"use these images for their sexual gratification; as a tool to groom
children to participate in sexual conduct; to affirm the notion that
abusive relationships are acceptable; to lower inhibitions of potential
victims, and to obtain money and profit.' 62 Leary then points to a
recent study showing that of those arrested for child pornography
who had molested children, 83% of the images they possessed were
images of children between six and twelve years old. 163 On these ba-
ses, then, severe criminal penalties were warranted, even for minors
who produced pictures of themselves.' 64
Curiously, Leary never cites Free Speech Coalition.1 65 Indeed, her
entire argument might have collapsed if she had. Surely, she could
not have meant that pictures of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds could
be used as a tool to groom young children into sexual activity. Nor is it
clear that the pictures could even sexually gratify child molesters. 166 In
fact, in some states, the sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds could have
sex with some adults because they are over the age of consent.167 The
harms then that Leary posits flow from "self-exploitation" are precisely
the types of contingent and indirect harms that the Court rejected in
refusing to create a new First Amendment exception for virtual child
pornography. 168
160 Id. at 40.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 40-41.
163 Id. at 41 (citing JANIS WOLAK ET AL., CHILD-PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORS ARRESTED IN
INTERNET-RELATED CRIMES: FINDINGS FROM THE National Juvenile Online Victimization Study vii
(2005)).
164 Leary, supra note 10, at 36.
165 535 U.S. 234 (2002). For that matter, aside from Ginsberg, she never cites any cases
dealing with minors' First Amendment fights.
166 See supra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.
167 See Worldwide Ages of Consent, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/age-of-consent.htm
(last visited Nov. 23, 2011) (collecting ages of consent throughout the world and for all
fifty states); see also Siji A. Moore, Note, Out of the Fire and into the Frying Pan: Georgia Legisla-
ture's Attempt to Regulate Teen Sex Through the CriminalJustice System, 52 How. L.J. 197, 222-23
nn.217-18 (2008) (collecting recent statutory provisions regarding ages of consent
throughout the United States).
168 Free Speech CoaL, 535 U.S. at 250 ("In contrast to the speech in Ferber, speech that
itself is the record of sexual abuse, the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and
creates no victims by its production. Virtual child pornography is not 'intrinsically related'
to the sexual abuse of children, as were the materials in Ferber. While the Government
asserts that the images can lead to actual instances of child abuse, the causal link is contin-
gent and indirect. The harm does not necessarily follow from the speech, but depends
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Responding to Leary, Stephen Smith concludes that the "prob-
lem of self-produced child pornography, in most instances, is one that
is best resolved through means other than prosecutions of minors.1 69
Yet even Smith takes pains to say that he is "not making any sort of
argument that child pornography-'self-produced' or otherwise-ei-
ther is, or should be, constitutionally protected. '170 This must be so,
he reasons because "[c]hildren should not be treated or depicted as
sexual objects to be used to satisfy the illegal and immoral carnal
desires of others."'17 1 But in many cases, and certainly in the case of
A.H., there simply was no underlying illegal carnal desire. Thus, Smith
and Leary both fail to fully account for the clear doctrinal problems
with classifying self-produced sexual images as child pornography
under Ferber and Free Speech Coalition.
D. Pedophiles and Sexually Active Minors Are Not Functionally
Equivalent
To be fair, child-pornography law has been "the least contested
area of First Amendment jurisprudence."1 72 One possible reason is
that the "incendiary"173 term "child pornography," conjures up the
image of "a fidgety old man on the street corner, at the schoolhouse
gate or hunched over a computer." 174 Child-pornography laws were
originally directed at stemming the activities of pedophiles. 175 The
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV) char-
acterizes pedophilia as involving "intense sexually arousing fantasies,
urges, or behaviors involving sexual activity with a prepubescent child
(typically age thirteen or younger) .-176 Accordingly, raising the age of
upon some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts." (internal citations
omitted)).
169 Smith, supra note 9, at 516. Smith's article is cited nearly as often as Leary's. See,
e.g., John M. Krattiger, Comment, Sex-Cells: Evaluating Punishments for Teen "Sexting" in
Oklahoma and Beyond, 63 OKLA. L. REv. 317, 349 (2011); Julia Halloran McLaughlin, Crime
and Punishment: Teen Sexting in Context, 115 PENN ST. L. REv. 135, 172 (2010); Robert H.
Wood, The Failure of Sexting Criminalization: A Plea for the Exercise of Prosecutorial Restraint, 16
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. Rrv. 151, 173 (2009). Thus, together, these two early articles
seem to establish the typical framework for the sexting debate.
170 Smith, supra note 9, at 520.
171 Id. at 521 (emphasis added).
172 Adler, supra note 32, at 925.
173 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
174 Slovic, supra note 5.
175 See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) ("[E]vidence suggests that
pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children .. ").
176 Psychiatric Disorders: Pedophilia, ALLPSYCH ONLINE, http://allpsych.com/disorders/
paraphilias/pedophilia.html (last updated May 15, 2004); see also Pam Cartor et a]., Differen-
tiating Pedophilia from Ephebophilia in Cleric Offenders, 15 SEXuAL ADDIurION & COMPULSMTYy
311, 312 (2008). Whether criminal prosecutions and punishments are appropriate for
those who have diagnosed mental illnesses that may cast doubt upon their actual culpabil-
ity is beyond the scope of this Note. For purposes of this Note, I have simply assumed that
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"child" from sixteen to eighteen for child-pornography purposes not
only swept up a great deal of consensual teenage activity but also the
sexual desires of many adults who do not have psychological disor-
ders.177 Although using the term "normal" to clinically describe erotic
desires is not permitted, 78 the Court itself has sought to legally distin-
guish between prurient interests in sex, and normal, healthy sexual
desires. 179 Teens who sext are thus neither traditional targets of child
pornography, nor do they necessarily satisfy the prurient interest
prong of the obscenity test.'8 0 Because even Ferber itself suggested that
it is permissible to treat as criminals any person who sexually abuses children, even those
persons who have been clinically diagnosed as pedophiles. Cf Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346, 351-53 (1997) (addressing constitutionality of indefinite civil commitment of
violent sex offenders in the context of conviction for sexual molestation of children).
177 Because many late adolescents have physical characteristics that are largely indistin-
guishable from those of adults, some level of sexual attraction to late adolescents is com-
mon among adults of all sexual orientations. E.g., David Tuller, What to Call Foley, SLATE
(Oct. 4, 2006, 5:59 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2151018/ ("Former Rep. Foley seems to
suffer from a different condition: ephebophilia, which is defined as sexual attraction to
post-pubescent adolescents and older teenagers."). Indeed, although the term
"ephebophilia," denotes a sexual preference for adolescents around fifteen to nineteen
years of age, the DSM IV does not list the term, likely because "[flew would want to label
erotic interest in late- or even mid-adolescents as a psychopathology. . . ." Ray Blanchard
et al., Pedophilia, Hebephilia, and the DSM-V, 38 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAv. 335, 336 (2009). At
any rate, engaging in sexual acts with a minor who has not attained the age of consent for
that particular sex act is a crime.
178 Id. at 336 (describing the general resistance or indifference to a technical vocabu-
lary for erotic age-preference but noting that the word "normal" has been off-limits for
decades). It is perhaps worth noting here as well that both Ferber and Osborne "involved
apparently gay-oriented pornography, a surprising disproportion considering the relative
representation of gays in the population as a whole." Humbach, supra note 131, at 448
n.79. Homosexuality was not removed from the DSM until 1974. See Shari Roan, Revising
the Book on Mental Illness: Experts Call for Listing Binge Eating and Gambling As Official Disor-
ders, but Not Sex Addiction or Obesity, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at Al. Adler notes that an
"anti-homosexual fervor" helped fuel legislative responses to child pornography. Adler,
supra note 95, at 230 n.116 (2001). Indeed, one expert testified before the House of Rep-
resentatives that "most agree that child sex and pornography is basically a boy-man phe-
nomenon." Id.
179 See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985). The Court has
distinguished between material that excites "normal, healthy sexual desires" and material
that excites "sexual responses over and beyond those that would be a characterized as
normal," including "a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion." Id.
180 But cf. Humbach, supra note 131, at 445 n.60 ("[T]he immediate question is
whether teens' depictions of teenage sexual activity for a teenage audience are better un-
derstood as appealing to 'normal, healthy sexual desires' or as 'shameful or morbid.' I
think we can agree that casual teen sexual relations probably did not fall within the 1986
heartland of 'good, old fashioned, healthy' sex."). See also State v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528,
528 (Iowa 2009) (holding that it could not conclude as a matter of law that the pictures a
teen sent to his girlfriend of his erect penis were not obscene). It is, to say the least and as
Adler put it, "internally incoherent" for a state to set the age of consent in recognition of
the facts that teens do have sex, while simultaneously calling that sexual activity morbid
and shameful. If anything, the age of consent necessarily means that sexual activity among
teenagers is tolerable, if not suitable. Cf Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14
(1975) ("Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate
proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a
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there might be a narrow range of cases to which its rule would not
apply, 81 as-applied challenges might have cabined the rapidly sprawl-
ing application of the sex-offender label to everyday teens.1 82
III
AFTER STEVENS, SEXTING PROSECUTIONS ARE
"PRESUMPTIVELY INVALID"
These theoretical inconsistencies, the utter incoherence of child-
pornography jurisprudence generally, and the serious constitutional
concerns raised by treating older teens' sexting as child pornography
were laid bare in United States v. Stevens.1 83 In Stevens, the Court re-
fused to create a new First Amendment exception for depictions of
animal cruelty. While the Court's holding received substantial atten-
legislative body thinks unsuitable for them." (emphasis added)). Moreover, even if the ma-
jority of Americans believe that sex among older teenagers is morally wrong, it is unclear
whether these majoritarian sexual preferences without more may be expressed through
the criminal law. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) ("[T]he fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not
a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice .... " (quoting Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))). In fact, by legally permit-
ting minors to have sex in the first instance, even before Stevens, States might well have
undermined their own rational bases for criminalizing expression of that sexual activity.
Cf Michael C. Dorf, All or Nothing Equality, DoRF ON LAw (Dec. 13, 2010, 12:01 AM), http:/
/www.dorfonlaw.org/2010/12/all-or-nothing-equality.html (suggesting that same-sex mar-
riage restrictions in California might lack a rational basis because California unlike other
states has already extended a great degree of equality to gay people, making the restriction
on marriage in particular arbitrary and irrational).
181 It is worth noting again what Ferber actually held. "[W] e hold that child pornogra-
phy as defined in § 263.15 is unprotected speech subject to content-based regulation." 458
U.S. 747, 766 n.18 (1982). "We hold that § 263.15 sufficiently describes a category of mate-
rial the production and distribution of which is not entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion." Id. at 765. Of course, even the Court itself does not always seem to have read Ferber
this narrowly. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288 (2008) ("Over the last
25 years, we have confronted a related and overlapping category of proscribable speech:
child pornography. This consists of sexually explicit visual portrayals that feature chil-
dren." (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Even here, thoughJustice Scalia, writ-
ing for the majority, left open the possibility of as-applied challenges. Id. ("We have held
that a statute which proscribes the distribution of all child pornography, even material that
does not qualify as obscenity, does not on its face violate the First Amendment." (emphasis
added)).
182 Although as-applied challenges seem inevitable, such challenges merely mean that
"[t]eens who find themselves prosecuted as child pornographers may or may not ulti-
mately receive constitutional protection." Humbach, supra note 131, at 450 ("[T]he exis-
tence of the [child pornography] exclusion effectively reverses the presumption, of
unconstitutionality that normally applies to content-based regulations of speech.") Thus,
teens seeking to challenge their prosecutions before Stevens generally faced the choice of
either mounting a "case-by-case 'as applied' challenge to a prima facie valid law (and
risk[ing] decades in jail) or plead[ingi guilty to a lesser charge." Id. at 451 (footnote
omitted). So far, as-applied challenges based upon similar reasoning have not fared well in
state courts. See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 238-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (re-
jecting as-applied challenge under Florida state constitution)
183 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
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tion in both the popular press184 and in law reviews, 185 the Court's
distinguishing of Ferber and the resulting doctrinal ramifications have
been less fully explored.' 86 In rejecting the Government's request to
carve out a new exception for depictions of animal cruelty, the Court
noted that
" [f]rom 1791 to the present" .. . the First Amendment has "permit-
ted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,"
and has never "include [d] a freedom to disregard these traditional
limitations." These "historic and traditional categories long familiar
to the bar"-including obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement,
and speech integral to criminal conduct-are "well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
of which have never been thought to raise any [c]onstitutional
problem."187
Notably absent from this list, of course, is child pornography.
In discussing Ferber, the Court effectively "assimilated child por-
nography to the traditionally unprotected category of 'speech integral
to criminal conduct." '1 8 While some have described the Court's
characterization of Ferber as novel, 189 a close reading of the cases prior
to Stevens shows that despite scholarly views to the contrary, the Court
had never created a bright-line rule that all depictions of minors en-
gaged in sexual acts were child pornography and thus excluded from
184 See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Justices Overturn Anti-Animal-Cruelty Law in Free Speech Case,
WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2010 at A3; Joan Biskupic, Major Rulings of the 2009-10 Term, USA
TODAY, June 28, 2010, at AS; Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed., The Court as Mr. Fix-It?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2010, at A19.
185 See, e.g., Patricia Millet et al., Mixed Signals: The Roberts Court and Free Speech in the
2009 Term, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1 (2010); Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investiga-
tions and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1 (2011).
186 At the time of this Note's publication, recent scholarship on sexting has only briefly
addressed the potential impact of Stevens in this area. See, e.g., JoAnne Sweeny, Do Sexting
Prosecutions Violate Teenagers' Constitutional Rights?, 48 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 951, 970 n.124-25
(2011); Lawrence G. Walters, How to Fix the Sexting Problem: An Analysis of the Legal and Policy
Considerations for Sexting, 9 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REv. 98, 114 (2010). Leary, continuing to
advocate for the prosecution of minors who sext, has attempted to understate the breadth
of the Court's reasoning in Stevens. See Mary Graw Leary, Sexting or Self-Produced Child Por-
nography? The Dialog Continues-Structured Prosecutorial Discretion Within a Multidisciplinary
Response, 17 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 486, 531 (2010) ("[T]o understand Stevens, a non-child
pornography case, as announcing a requirement of depicting illegality in all child pornog-
raphy cases would produce collateral effects well beyond self-produced child pornography
and 'sexting' cases. Suddenly requiring unprotected material to display illegal conduct
would legalize a broad swath of material always thought to be included under child por-
nography."). Of course, the Court had held prior to Stevens that sexual speech that was
neither obscene nor the product of child abuse was fully protected by the First Amend-
ment. See supra Part II.A and notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
187 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584 (citations omitted).
188 Strossen, supra note 25, at 85.
189 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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First Amendment protection. 190 As a practical matter, though, legal
scholars must have been aware that even if they read Ferber as creating
a categorical exclusion, the rule, "[1l]ike many bright line
rules . . . [was] only 'categorical' for a page or two in the U.S.
Reports." 191
Thus, discussions about the inconsistent applications of child-por-
nography statutes and whether teens should mount as-applied chal-
lenges to sexting prosecutions are now somewhat academic because
after Stevens child-pornography statutes themselves must be consid-
ered content-based regulations on speech. 19 2 Although sometimes
listed in different fashions, the categories of unprotected speech
before Stevens were the following: incitement, fighting words, true
threats, defamation, obscenity, child pornography, fraud, and speech
integral to criminal conduct' 9 3 After Stevens, however, the list is lim-
ited, for the time being, 194 to obscenity, defamation, fraud, incite-
ment, and speech integral to criminal conduct. 19 5 Thus, whereas
190 Compare Humbach, supra note 131, at 449 n.83 (citing cases) ("There is no real
doubt that the Court in Ferber created a categorical exclusion . . . ."), with New York v.
Ferber, 457 U.S. 747, 766 n.18 (1982) ("[W]e hold that child pornography as defined in
§ 263.15 is unprotected speech subject to content-based regulation." (emphasis added)),
and id. at 765 ("We hold that § 263.15 sufficiently describes a category of material the
production and distribution of which is not entitled to First Amendment protection.").
191 Humbach, supra note 131, at 450 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1067 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("No sooner does the Court state [its new cate-
gory] .. .than it quickly establishes an exception . ")).
192 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586-87. Content-based restrictions on speech are invalid
unless they pass strict scrutiny. See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738
(2011) ("The [s] tate must specifically identify an 'actual problem' in need of solving and
the curtailment of free speech must be actually necessary to the solution. That is a de-
manding standard. 'It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will
ever be permissible.'" (internal citations omitted)).
193 Rhodes, supra note 25, at 2. But even this list may not have been complete. As
recently as 2008, the Court seemingly expanded the list, or at least changed the way it
described it. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) ("Offers to en-
gage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.");
Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) ("The First Amendment contains the
freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified, which included exceptions for ob-
scenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets. . . ." (emphasis added)).
194 The Court left open the possibility that there could be new categories of unpro-
tected speech. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 ("Maybe there are some categories of speech
that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or
discussed as such in our case law. But if so, there is no evidence that 'depictions of animal
cruelty' is among them. We need not foreclose the future recognition of such additional
categories to reject the Government's highly manipulable balancing test as a means of
identifying them."). One Justice has recently identified speech to minors and minors' ac-
cess to speech as a category of historically unprotected speech that had not previously been
specifically identified. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2751 ("The practices and beliefs of the
founding generation establish that 'the freedom of speech,' as originally understood, does
not include a right to speak to minors (or a right of minors to access speech) without going
through the minors' parents or guardians.") (Thomas, J., dissenting).
195 See Rhodes, supra note 25, at 6.
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before Stevens many believed-perhaps erroneously-that any sexually
explicit image of a minor was child pornography, this belief is now
fatally flawed. Instead, in determining whether a particular nonob-
scene image constitutes child pornography, the initial question must
be whether there is specific illegal conduct to which the speech is inte-
gral. Because neither nudity, masturbation, nor even large amounts
of teenage sex are illegal, statutory-rape laws are the most logical start-
ing point for determining whether sexted images sent between older
teens are protected speech. 196
A. Statutory-Rape Laws
Generally, statutory-rape laws prohibit sexual intercourse with an
unmarried person under the age of consent. 197 Statutory-rape laws
were on the books in England as early as the thirteenth century.198 At
the time of the Founding, colonial statutes basically imported this lan-
guage, choosing either ten or twelve as the age of consent. 199 Since
the Founding, the actual age of consent has varied as the result of
various policy initiatives by interest groups and public officials. 200 At
one point, Delaware's age of consent was as low as seven years old, and
Tennessee's as high as twenty-one. 20 1 While these variations in age of
consent do not necessarily mean that the states are constitutionally
free to set the age of consent wherever they would like,202 the Su-
196 It is worth noting that while this approach would not lead to granting constitu-
tional protection to a large amount of material that would be of interest to actual
pedophiles, see supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text, there could be some materials
that would interest pedophiles. Although most states have set the age of consent at sixteen
or older, Connecticut, for example, exempts minors under the age of thirteen from crimi-
nal liability for consensual sexual activity if there is less than a two-year age difference
between the minors. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70(a) (2) (West 2007). Thus, if mi-
nors of this age group sext, there could be pictures that could fall into this category that
would be of the type Leary identified. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
197 Statutory rape is mostly a colloquial term as opposed to a strictly legal one. The
title of the offense varies by state and includes such names as "rape in the nth de-
gree,... sexual assault in the nth degree... sexual battery in the nth degree ... statutory
sexual seduction, sexual abuse of a minor, child sexual abuse, child molestation, child
rape, and indecency with a child." CoccA, supra note 4, at 164 n. 1. Whatever the offense is
called, generally, "if the victim is under that certain age and not married to the perpetra-
tor, he or she is presumed incapable of giving informed and valid consent to sexual activ-
ity; therefore, consensuality is not permitted as a defense to the crime." Id. at 9 (footnote
omitted).
198 Id. at 10 (quoting the Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 13 (Eng.) ("The
King prohibiteth that none do ravish .. .any Maiden within age.")).
199 See id. at 10, 23 tbl.1.1 (charting ages of consent from 1885 to 1999 and age spans in
the fifty states in 1999).
200 Id. at 10.
201 Id. at 14-23.
202 There must be some threshold beyond which states could not go. Although Ten-
nessee once set its age of consent at twenty-one, that seems to be the high watermark.
Surely criminalizing consensual sex beyond this age-aside from the fact that "such a law
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preme Court has previously rejected a constitutional challenge to a
statutory-rape law.
In Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County,20 3 the Court sus-
tained a California statute that criminalized sexual intercourse with an
unmarried female under eighteen. The case involved a seventeen-
year-old male, Michael, and a sixteen-year-old female, Sharon. 20 4
Under that particular statute, only males could commit the crime, and
only females could be its victims. 20 5 The Court rejected petitioner's
argument that the statute's gender specificity was not substantially re-
lated to an important governmental objective and instead had as its
purpose the "anachronistic protection of female chastity."20 6 Because
of the "profound physical, emotional, and psychological conse-
quences of [teen] sexual activity,"20 7 the Court concluded that Califor-
nia's punishing only males for violations of the statute did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause because it would "'equalize' the deter-
rents on the sexes"208 when teenagers decide to engage in sexual activ-
ity. While Michael M. is "much-criticized,"20 9 it stands for the
proposition that a state may criminalize the sexual activity of minors.
Thus, for First Amendment analytical purposes, statutory-rape laws are
likely "valid criminal statute [s]" within the meaning of Stevens. 210
B. Tying Child-Pornography Statutes to the Age of Consent
Would Reaffirm First Amendment Principles
Several scholars have recently called for more reasoned responses
to the sexting epidemic. 211 These include educational and juvenile
would not long stand in our democratic society"-would raise constitutional concerns. See
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 584-85 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
203 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
204 Id. at 466.
205 Id.
206 COCCA, supra note 4, at 70.
207 Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471.
208 Id. at 473.
209 COCCA, supra note 4.
210 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although the Court struck
down a law against consensual homosexual sodomy in Lawrence, the Court noted that the
case did not involve minors. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). Thus in addi-
tion to Michael M., Lawrence further supports the idea that states may criminalize the sexual
activity of minors. Whether criminalizing consensual sexual activity between minors is wise
policy is debatable, but under current doctrine such criminalization is likely constitutional.
But see In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ohio 2011) ("As applied to children under the age
of 13 who engage in sexual conduct with other children under the age of 13, [the Ohio
statutory-rape statute] is unconstitutionally vague because the statute authorizes and en-
courages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement enforcement."); id. at 534 ("Applica-
tion of [the Ohio statutory-rape statute] in this case also violates D.B.'s federal right to
equal protection.").
211 See, e.g., Humbach, supra note 131, at 438-39 (pointing out that the current system
of laws addressing sexting is overbroad and archaic).
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programs, as well as statutes that specifically address sexting as a new
category distinct from child pornography. 212 It is unclear whether
these would be valid criminal statutes to which sexting prosecutions
could be tied. Indeed, the arguments put forth are not unlike the
ones advanced by the Government in Stevens: because sexting causes
"serious, and often unanticipated, psychological and reputational con-
sequences,"213 it warrants legislative responses targeting the speech.
But because sexting between teens who have reached the age of con-
sent is neither child pornography214 nor likely obscenity, 21 5 any stat-
utes that seek to address sexting without tying the activity to the age of
consent would problematically draw content-based distinctions.21 6
Such content-based distinctions on speech are presumptively in-
valid and subject to strict scrutiny.2 17 To survive strict scrutiny, the
content-based restriction must be narrowly tailored to promote a com-
pelling governmental interest using the "least restrictive means."2 18
While diversionary programs may be less restrictive than felony prose-
cutions, it is far from clear that they are the least restrictive means.2 19
In any event, at least one scholar has noted that "a majority of the
Court has never sustained a regulation that was strictly scrutinized for
content discrimination reasons. '220
212 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 9, at 541-43 (advocating various uses of criminal law to
limit sexting).
213 Ryan, supra note 61, at 357.
214 See supra Part II.
215 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
216 For a discussion of whether a statutory restriction on child pornography, and there-
fore sexting could be considered "content-neutral," and thus subject only to intermediate
scrutiny, see Humbach, supra note 131, at 473-82. Note, however, that had the Court
treated the original restriction in Ferber as content-neutral, the Court could not have been
"readily able to justify the creation of a new content-based categorical exclusion-and
thereby authorize sweeping statutory bans of all child pornography." Id, at 475 n.233.
217 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (content-based distinc-
tions presumptively invalid); United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813
(2000) (strict scrutiny for content-based restrictions).
218 Playboy Entmt Grp., 529 U.S. at 813 (quoting Sable Commcn's, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989)).
219 Parents, for example, could choose simply not to buy their children cell phones
with cameras or buy reduced text-messaging plans for cell phones that have cameras. Cf.
id. at 825. ("Even upon the assumption that the Government has an interest in substituting
itself for informed and empowered parents, its interest is not sufficiently compelling to
justify this widespread restriction on speech. The Government's argument stems from the
idea that parents do not know their children are viewing the material on a scale or fre-
quency to cause concern, or if so, that parents do not want to take affirmative steps to
block it and their decisions are to be superseded. The assumptions have not been estab-
lished; and in any event the assumptions apply only in a regime where the option of block-
ing has not been explained.").
220 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2734 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("Indeed, where, as here, a statute applies criminal penalties and at least argua-
bly does so on the basis of content-based distinctions, I should think we would scrutinize
the statute and justifications 'strictly'-to determine whether the prohibition is justified by
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Further, tying sexting statutes to validly enacted statutory-rape or
age-of-consent statutes would re-invert 221 the First Amendment, restor-
ing basic First Amendment principles. Traditionally, "free speech ju-
risprudence has held that liberties in the realm of expression must
remain broader than liberties in the realm of action. '222 For the most
part, the Court's jurisprudence on sexual speech has reversed that
rule. 223 Indeed, permitting states to impose legal sanctions on older
teens for sexting only serves to perpetuate the "suggest[ion] that there
is something more dangerous about the representation of sex than
the act of sex itself-a most perplexing premise indeed."224 Tying
child-pornography statutes to age-of-consent statutes would therefore
make the realm of allowable expression at least as broad as the realm
of allowable action.
IV
SEXTING AS A SEX ACT?
While holding that sexting is constitutionally protected speech is
fairly straightforward as a doctrinal matter, it seems problematic as a
practical one. It is clear that many states will continue to try to regu-
late teens' sexting. Forcing states to tie sexting prosecutions to the
age of consent could cause many states perversely to increase the age
of consent to eighteen. 225 This would have the unpalatable conse-
quence of criminalizing an even wider swath of everyday teenage activ-
ity. 2 2 6 These difficulties suggest that for those states that insist on
criminalizing sexting, a radical rethinking of the way activities like
"sexting" are treated may be appropriate. In this Part, I briefly revisit
Catharine MacKinnon's view that "sex pictures [should be] legally
considered sex acts."2 27 Although many have long regarded this the-
ory as somewhat radical, and completely contrary to current First
Amendment doctrine, sexting presents an opportunity for a poten-
a 'compelling' need that cannot be 'less restrictively' accommodated."); Humbach, supra
note 131, at 470 n.220 (citing Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content
Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1365 n.63
(2006)).
221 Cf Adler, supra note 32, at 925-27.
222 John Tehranian, Sanitizing Cyberspace: Obscenity, Miller, and the Future of Public Dis-
course on the Internet, 1IJ. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 4 (2003).
223 David Cole, Playing by Pornography's Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 111, 114 (1994) ("Central to the First Amendment tradition is the notion that
one has broader freedom in one's expression than in one's acts. When it comes to sex,
however, the rule is reversed.").
224 Tehranian, supra note 222, at 4.
225 See Dorf, supra note 180 (describing various areas of constitutional law in which
similar phenomena occur).
226 The median age of first intercourse is 16.9 years for boys and 17.4 years for girls.
KAISER FOUNDATION, supra note 1.
227 CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, ONLY WORDS 36 (1993).
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tially valid application of the theory. While the First Amendment may
not permit the state to criminalize older teens' depictions of their sex-
ual conduct, it seems equally clear that the First Amendment does not
prohibit states from regulating minors' sex acts.
A. Old Battles in a New Medium
As Amy Adler notes, the assumption that speech is different from
all other forms of action is such a basic assumption of free-speech law
that it hardly needs repeating. 228 Scholars have questioned whether
the distinction is accurate or even useful, but nevertheless, the distinc-
tion serves complex functions in First Amendment law.22 9 In the
1980s, MacKinnon began to assail the speech/action dichotomy in the
context of pornography. MacKinnon argued that pornographic
images were inseparable from the violence that produced them.230
She declared that pornography institutionalized "a subhuman, victim-
ized, second-class status for women by conditioning men's orgasm to
sexual inequality."2 31 For MacKinnon, pornography was not the rep-
resentation of sex but was sex itself.232 When the Seventh Circuit
struck down the antipornography ordinance that MacKinnon had
drafted, it rejected the idea that a representation is reality.233
Broadly, the Seventh Circuit's rejection of the statute was sound.
From even a feminist perspective, MacKinnon's theory was "radical,"
because it assumed that all men, particularly those who consumed
pornography, were participants in a system of female subjugation. 234
Further, it assumed that even if females did consent to pornography,
their consent was inherently invalid because "all pornography [was]
made under conditions of inequality based on sex, overwhelmingly by
poor, desperate, homeless, pimped women who were sexually abused
as children."23 5 Because the harms caused by pornography were so
immediate and inevitable, MacKinnon blurred the distinction be-
tween speech and action and saw pornography as central to a process
228 Adler, supra note 32, at 972.
229 Id. at 973.
230 See ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS:
A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY 46 (1988) (describing how women and children are
violently exploited during the making of pornography).
231 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES, MEN'S LAWS 316 (2005).
232 Adler, supra note 32, at 986 ("MacKinnon frequently derides critics for their failure
to understand this essential basis of her theory, that pornography is sex, not the represen-
tation of sex.").
233 Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986) ("The description of women's sexual domination of men in Lysistrata was not
real dominance. Depictions may affect slavery, war, or sexual roles, but a book about slav-
ery is not itself slavery, or a book about death by poison a murder.").
234 See HUGH POTTER, PORNOGRAPHY. GROUP PRESSURES AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, 27-28
(1996).
235 MACKINNON, supra note 227, at 20.
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of social conditioning that perpetuated gender inequality. As the Sev-
enth Circuit aptly noted, however, "[p]eople may be conditioned in
subtle ways. If the fact that speech plays a role in the process of condi-
tioning were enough to permit governmental regulation, that would
be the end of freedom of speech." 236 While the notion that all por-
nography is the subjugation of women has been rejected, it does not
necessarily follow that some sex pictures could not legally qualify as
sex acts. 23 7 Sexting is perhaps a paradigmatic example.
B. Sexting: A Bilateral Sexual Exchange
Sexting is not necessarily pure speech. 238 While it is probably in-
accurate to call sexted images nothing more than "masturbatory
aids,"239 the fact that several authors have described sexting as the
modern day equivalent of streaking 240 or high-tech flirting 241 under-
scores a general inclination to somehow treat sexting as action rather
than speech. To the extent that sexting is done simply to entice or
titillate sexual partners, sexting may be a new form of foreplay.242
States already restrict minors' ability to engage in sex acts that are
typically considered foreplay. 243 Thus for those who support criminal-
ization, the only real hurdle to this approach is fully distinguishing
between sex acts that are speech and those that are not. The current
236 Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 771 F.2d at 330.
237 For discussion of whether the Court had previously accepted MacKinnon's view,
see Adler, supra note 32, at 987 ("In child pornography law, at last, the Court seems to
understand what MacKinnon's critics have dismissed as metaphor: the picture is the harm.
MacKinnon has been vindicated."); see also ATrORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 64, at
406 ("Child pornography necessarily includes the sexual abuse of a real child, and there
can be no understanding of the special problem of child pornography until there is under-
standing of the special way in which child pornography is child abuse.").
238 See Ryan, supra note 61, at 366. This is largely beside the point. Prosecutors charg-
ing teens with child pornography have done so on the basis of their speech and not their
conduct. In any event, sexting could also qualify as expressive conduct under current First
Amendment doctrine. To qualify as expressive conduct, an act must be intended to convey
a particularized message and there must be a great likelihood that the message would be
understood by those who view it. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974)
(per curiam). At the very least, a sexted image conveys the message "this is what I look like
nude."
239 Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 795, 807-08 (1993)
("Many forms of pornography are not an appeal to the exchange of ideas, political or
otherwise; they operate as masturbatory aids . ).
240 Eraker, supra note 26, at 557.
241 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
242 Foreplay is "[s] exual stimulation preceding intercourse." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 533 (3d ed. 2003).
243 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-4(a)(2) (2011) (criminalizing a minor from acting
"with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires" of another minor); accord United
States v, Stocks, 35 MJ. 366, 367 (C.M.A. 1992) (noting that oral sex is "mere oral
foreplay").
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distinction between pornography and prostitution may provide some
guidance.
Sex acts are legally significant events. 24 4 For First Amendment
purposes, this Note proposes defining sex acts as bilateral sexual ex-
changes to which legal consequences may validly attach.2 45 Although
the line between prostitution and pornography seems arbitrary,246 the
distinction is instructive, and may prove useful to those states that wish
to consider a different approach to regulating sexting. Traditionally,
prostitution has been defined as a "bilateral [sexual] exchange '2 47 be-
tween A and B. Pornography on the other hand generally involves a
nonparticipating C, who pays A to perform a sex act on B. 248 Because
the effect of pornography "occurs through the mediation of an audi-
ence" rather than from C participating in a sex act with A or B, por-
nography and its production are protected by the First
Amendment.249 Another distinction is that pornography "neither pre-
cipitate [s] nor perpetuate [s] the social ills"'250 that follow from prosti-
tution. 251 Taken together, these propositions could lead to the
conclusion that where a sex act does not require the mediation of a
244 Sherry F. Colb, The Legal Line Between Prostitution and Porn, CNN JusTicE (Aug. 12,
2005), http://articles.cnn.com/2005-08-12/justice/colb.pornography-l-prostitution-ring-
sexual-services-pornography?s=PM:LAW (last visited Nov. 23, 2011) ("The sex act is a le-
gally significant event. If it occurs without consent, it is rape. If it takes place between a
married person and a third party, it is adultery. If it occurs and leads to the birth of a
child, then the man is legally responsible for that child until the age of 18. And if it hap-
pens in exchange for a fee, then it is prostitution.").
245 See, e.g., id.
246 Id. ("The distinction between pornography and prostitution is not, however, quite
so straightforward ....").
247 People v. Paulino, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3430, at *10 (Sup. Ct. 2005); see also
People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128, 1130-31 (Cal. 1988) ("[For] a 'lewd' or 'dissolute' act
to constitute 'prostitution,' the genitals, buttocks, or female breast, of either the prostitute
or the customer must come in contact with some part of the body of the other for the
purpose of sexual arousal orgratification of the customer or of the prostitute." (alteration in origi-
nal)). Further, "[w]hether or not prostitution must always involve a "customer," it is clear
that in order to constitute prostitution, the money or other consideration must be paid for
the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification." Id. (emphasis omitted).
248 Sherry Colb rightly points out the difficulty of sustaining this distinction without
more. In her example, she points to the fact that an uncle who pays a prostitute to sleep
with his 21-year-old nephew does not suddenly become a pornographer. See supra note
244, at 4.
249 Id.
250 Paulino, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3530, at *14.
251 This proposition is also far from clear. While the social ills the judge points to are
certainly different from those described by MacKinnon, supra Part IV.A and accompanying
notes, pornography can also bring with it a host of ills including "AIDS, venereal diseases,
[and] drugs," Paulino, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3530 at *13. For a description of the STD
transmissions in the adult-film industry, see, for example, Molly Hennessy-Fiske, HI-Posi-
tive Porn Performer Speaks Out, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2010. Nevertheless, these consequences
flowing from the sex act itself only potentially affect A or B and not C.
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nonparticipating party, legal consequences may attach to the sex act
without running afoul of the First Amendment.
Under this approach, sexting could be viewed as a bilateral sexual
exchange more akin to prostitution than to pornography, the creation
of which necessarily entails a nonparticipating C. Sexting, like other
forms of foreplay, entails one party performing a sex act for another.
To be sure, unlike prostitution, sexting is not generally associated with
monetary exchanges. But a fee is not typically a necessary condition
for the state to attach legal consequences to a sex act. Although the
sexted image may be forwarded to a third party, this fact alone would
not transform the sexted image into pornography. In pornography, A
and B have zero expectation of privacy and intend for there to be a
nonparticipating C.252 Indeed, this privacy rationale is probably the
basis of tort liability when adults disseminate pictures of their sexual
partners without consent.253 Moreover, the types of harm identified
with teen sexting, including bullying, suicide, and depression, are not
entirely different from the "profound physical, emotional, and psy-
chological consequences of [teen] sexual activity" that the Court iden-
tified in Michael M.254 Accordingly, states that insist on regulating
sexting may want to consider treating sexting as a sex act and may
want to regulate it in much the same way that those states regulate
other sex acts. 2
55
Acknowledging that there is probably room in the doctrine for
this approach, however, is not to say that treating sexting as a sex act is
normatively desirable. It is not. It is certainly not to say that this ap-
proach is not without its own potential constitutional infirmities. Al-
though the Supreme Court has intimated that minors do not
necessarily have a protected liberty interest in any particular sex
act,256 the exercise of state police power is still subject to rational basis
review. While the harms associated with sexting are somewhat similar
to the harms associated with teen sexual activity in general, they are
distinguishable. At the very least, sexting does not give rise to the pos-
252 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. Secondary sexting is beyond the scope of
this Note.
253 See Ryan, supra note 61, at 381-82 (discussing state- and federal-court recognition
of IED and invasion-of-privacy claims for adults in circumstances analogous to secondary
sexting).
254 450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981).
255 As Carolyn Cocca points out, "[s]tatutory rape laws, their meanings constructed
and reconstructed to reflect contemporary economic, political, social, and cultural anxie-
ties, help some and harm others." CoccA, supra note 4, at 138. Present trends indicate that
states are generally decriminalizing consensual sexual acts between minors close in age.
There is no reason to assume that if sexting were considered a sex act that this trend in
liberalization would reverse itself.
256 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (noting that "[t]he present case
does not involve minors").
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sibility of pregnancy, abortion, or sexually transmitted diseases. Thus
a legislative judgment that sexting was somehow more harmful for mi-
nors as a sex act than other sex acts such as intercourse would perhaps
stretch the bounds of rationality. 257
CONCLUSION
This Note has explored the sexting phenomenon and its preva-
lence among today's teenagers. Parts II and III have explained why
sexting among older teens is constitutionally protected speech. Even
before Stevens, sexual speech that was neither obscene nor the result
of child abuse was likely constitutionally protected. In the wake of this
decision, however, sexual speech involving minors that is not in viola-
tion of a valid criminal statute is definitely constitutionally protected.
Accordingly, where a teen has passed his or her state's age of consent,
sexted images do not raise any First Amendment concerns. At the
same time, however, it is important to recognize that sexting does
have the potential to cause harm and that some states will likely desire
to deter these harms in a manner consistent with the First Amend-
ment. Treating sexting as a sex act may provide an alternative ap-
proach that allows the expression of societal disapprobation without
violating minors' First Amendment rights. 258
Adler correctly points out that it is always tempting to try to clas-
sify offensive speech as action.259 It is plausible, however, that societal
reactions to teen sexual speech, or perhaps more accurately, teen sex
acts, may not be based on offensiveness alone. Instead, the reactions
could be part of society's "enduring fascination with the lives and
destinies of the young" and "the vital interest we all have in the forma-
tive years we ourselves once knew, when wounds can be so grievous,
disappointment so profound, and mistaken choices so tragic, but
when moral acts and self-fulfillment are still in reach."260 Without a
doubt, this very fascination undergirds the desire to have an age of
257 See, e.g., In reD.B., 950 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ohio 2011) (declaring Ohio statutory-rape
law violative of federal due process and equal protection guarantees as applied to a child
under the age of thirteen who engages in sexual conduct with another child under the age
of thirteen); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, MacDonald v.Johnson, No. 10-852, (2011), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1574 (2011) (challenging validity of Virginia statute that criminalizing
sodomy between "minors" and "adults," although Virginia's age of consent is fifteen); see
also Adam Liptak, A Place on the Sex-Offender Registry for a Crime that May Be Off the Books, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011, at A12 (describing the controversy surrounding the Virginia statute).
258 It is beyond the scope of this Note whether permitting teens who have passed the
age of consent to engage in certain specified sex acts and not others would violate any
other constitutional rights of minors. Cf Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 257.
259 See Adler, supra note 32, at 1002 ("The desire to erase the distinction between
speech and conduct is at the core of many censorship movements."); see also Richards v.
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 392 n.4 (1997) ("It is always somewhat dangerous to ground ex-
ceptions to constitutional protections in the social norms of a given historical moment.").
260 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 248 (2002).
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consent. With these views in mind, states could perhaps conceive of
sexting as a bilateral sexual exchange and regulate the activity as a sex
act in light of the state's age of consent. Doing so would allow society
to express its interests in a way that would help bring coherence to
First Amendment law, and by avoiding erroneously calling sexting
child pornography, would not necessarily equate Jane and Jim with
"dirty old men in raincoats."
Surely, however, sex acts are "formative" parts of "self-fulfill-
ment." The age of consent represents the societal determination that
minors have reached an age at which they can continue on the path to
self-fulfillment by legally exploring their sexuality. Perhaps once they
have passed the age of consent, Jane andJim ought to be able to reach
their self-fulfillment through the use of their cell phones, free from
the shadow of the criminal law.
